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Commentary

The Paradox of (Eco)pragmatism
Jamie A. Grodskyt
INTRODUCTION
When we assess environmental programs from the
standpoint of eco-pragmatism, where should we focus the zoom
lens? Should we evaluate statutory schemes as a whole,
mindful of their disparate political histories and implementing
mechanisms, or can we justifiably limit our scope and evaluate
discrete segments? Might certain programs be viewed as ecopragmatic in their totality, yet unyielding in their individual
parts? Likewise, at what point in time should we snap the
photo? How might a shift in temporal perspective change our
conception of what is pragmatic and what is not? Could any
statutory program be perceived as eco-pragmatic, depending on
where we set the zoom or when we snap the photo?
Perhaps this sense of relativism should lead to further
inquiry about how and when to define, create, and evaluate
regulatory instruments from an eco-pragmatic standpoint. In
such an inquiry, we may need to account for the fact that many
mechanisms and programs, seemingly draconian at first
glimpse, will be smoothed around the edges by ineluctable,
countervailing forces. Perhaps we cannot rightfully appraise a
statutory or regulatory scheme until we have given it time to
interact with the courts, the press, interest groups, and
Congress's own re-evaluative mechanisms. At least some
prescriptive rules, when given time to simmer in the spotlight
of the press and the cauldron of politics, may emerge to become
more eco-pragmatic than their more obviously pragmatic
counterparts-specifically, programs designed to embrace a

t Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
This Essay is an extension of remarks delivered at the University of
Minnesota Law School's Symposium, The PragmaticEcologist.
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"pragmatist middle."' Venturing a step further, we may find
that certain nondiscretionary statutory commands or
procedures, which initially might be labeled unforgiving and
thus unsustainable under Dan Farber's eco-pragmatic
framework, 2 ultimately may serve as preconditions for
developing new kinds of pragmatic, environmentally protective
measures, such as pollution emissions trading, habitat
conservation planning, and other market and contract-based
programs. 3 Therein lies the paradox. Recent experiments in
regulatory innovation suggest that certain kinds of pragmatic
instruments may depend upon unequivocal statutory baseline
commands that might not comport with Eco-pragmatism's
4
hybrid approach.
In this Essay, I examine eco-pragmatism from two
perspectives. First, I suggest that, as illustrated by the story of
the Endangered Species Act (ESA), even where a program is
initiated by a statute that asserts environmental values in a
strong, seemingly unequivocal way, the integration of economic
and environmental considerations may effectively take place
through the give and take of our political system. Various
incentive structures operating outside the formal legal
framework may help integrate competing values and temper
the positive law, resulting in a regime with qualities strikingly

1.

See J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REV.

385, 387 (2002) (stating that those adopting an "aggressive middle" approach
can actively define their positions, as opposed to letting the "middle" be
defined by default).
2.

DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 13 (1999). A central element of

Eco-pragmatism.is the concept of social sustainability. The book begins with
the premise that, to be sustainable, environmental law must accommodate not
only environmentalism, but economics and other key values. Otherwise, it
will be subject to backlash and ultimately will erode. Id. A statute that
asserts

a clear, nondiscretionary

environmental value

as

a command,

particularly one that can be enforced by third parties in litigation, arguably
could be considered unsustainable under this framework.
3. See infra Part IV (discussing Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs),
Project XL, Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs), and emissions
trading).
4. In this Essay, I use the term "eco-pragmatism" generically as well as
in reference to Farber's book. References to the book are italicized.
Farber's hybrid approach starts with a presumption in favor of the
environment, but that presumption is tempered by technical and economic
feasibility considerations. Formal cost-benefit analysis serves as a back-stop
where costs are "grossly disproportionate to the benefits" of environmental
protection. FARBER, supra note 2, at 12; see also infra notes 44-62 and
accompanying text.
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similar to those sought through an eco-pragmatic analytic
framework.
Second, viewing statutes as bargaining catalysts, 5 I
consider whether something of value may be lost if we reject
the use of clear statutory baselines as tools to advance
environmental goals. This point is illustrated not only by
longstanding and substantially evolved regulatory regimes, but
also in the effective use of newer market and contract-based
approaches. By characterizing statutes as the "opening gambits
in a prolonged bargaining process," 6 Farber's more recent
writings on "slippage"7 may help provide a foundation for
constructing useful new decision-making principles. Only by
viewing statutes from a dynamic or systems perspective can we
evaluate the relative efficiencies of traditional regulatory
structures and proposed alternatives in a meaningful way.
I. PRAGMATISM AND PERSPECTIVE
A. SHIFTING THE PERCEPTUAL FRAME
The implications of shifting the contextual and temporal
frames are evident in the respective evaluations of the ESA by
Farber and J.B. Ruhl. As originally enacted in 1973, the ESA
would not be considered eco-pragmatic by any measure. The
Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill noted that "[o]ne would be hard
pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any
plainer than those in section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act.... This language admits of no exception. '8 Likewise, the
5. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 297,
317 (1999).
6. Id.
7. The slippage concept expresses the disparity between environmental
regulatory mandates and actual enforcement. Id. at 298. Negative slippage
includes lax enforcement, missed deadlines by regulators or regulated parties,
and noncompliance by regulated parties. Id. at 299. Affirmative or positive
slippage occurs when regulators fashion alternatives to compliance with
statutory mandates. Id. at 307. This would include decisions to substitute
formal standards on a case-by-case basis with negotiated agreements. See text
accompanying notes 63-71.
.
8. 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978). Section 7 of the ESA requires each federal
agency, in consultation with the Secretary of Interior or Commerce, to insure

that any actions authorized, funded, or carried out by the agency are "not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification" of such
species' critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2) (2002).
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absolute prohibition on "taking" of endangered species in
section 9 might be viewed as an unmitigated triumph of
9
environmental over economic values.
Farber views the statute through a wide-angle lens and
from a long-term perspective, however, and concludes that the
ESA may be deemed eco-pragmatic at a "macro" level.
Accounting for various amendments and balancing procedures,
including the 1978 establishment of the Endangered Species
Committee (or "God Squad") and the accompanying exemption
process, he finds that the ESA comports with his recommended
hybrid approach for integrating economic and environmental
considerations:
Congress obviously felt that destruction of endangered species posed a
threat of serious environmental harm, and it also seems clear that
compliance by the government with the statute overall was feasiblethat is, there is no reason to think that avoiding the destruction of
endangered species, as a general matter, involves costs that are

grossly disproportionate to any environmental benefit. Thus, at a
"macro" level, the statute is consistent with the hybrid approach.1"

Similarly, in this Symposium, Ruhl chooses to evaluate
section 9 and the later developed section 10 together,
concluding that the taking prohibition of section 9 is ecopragmatic when viewed in conjunction with section 10's
exemption for incidental takes and Habitat Conservation Plans
(HCPs).II Ruhl concludes that the ESA, as a whole, is
"remarkably eco-pragmatic." 12

B.

EVOLUTION OF THE

ESA

The history of the ESA suggests that certain statutory
programs, even if absolutist at the outset, may tend toward
9.

Section 9 of the ESA makes it unlawful to "take" (defined by

regulation as "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,
or collect") any endangered animal species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1), 1532(19);
see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Oregon, 515

U.S. 687, 690-91 (1995).
10. FARBER, supra note 2, at 128-30.
11. Ruhl couples section 9 with section 10 by pointing to the "except as
provided" caveat in the take prohibition. J.B. Ruhl, Is the EndangeredSpecies
Act Eco-pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885, 920 (2003). Section 9 reads,

"Except as provided in sections 1535 (g)(2) and 1539 of this title [incidental
take exception and

Habitat Conservation Plans],

with respect

to any

endangered species of fish or wildlife ... it is unlawful for any person subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States to . .. take any such species within the
United States or the territorial sea of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1538
(a)(1)(B).
12. Ruhl, supra note 11, at 886.
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pragmatism through an organic or evolutionary process. As
Zygmunt Plater, the lead plaintiffs attorney in TVA v. Hill, has
described, public response to the Court's strict enforcement of
section 7 led to Congress's passage of a series of amendments
incorporating various balancing mechanisms. 3 For example,
the 1978 amendments 14 included authorization of the
aforementioned Endangered Species Committee, which can
provide case-specific exemptions to section 7 jeopardy findings
as long as certain criteria are met-one of which involves
balancing the benefits of species preservation against the
benefits of the proposed project. 15 The insertion of an economic
balancing test into section 4's critical habitat designation
16
process also was a direct legislative response to TVA v. Hill.
13. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law in the Political
Ecosystem-Coping with the Reality of Politics, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 423,
446 (2002) (discussing the role of politics in the snail darter case); Zygmunt
J.B. Plater, Law and the FourthEstate: EndangeredNature, the Press, and the
Dicey Game of Democratic Governance, 32 ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing the
sustainability and influence of mischaracterizations of the snail darter
controversy and their effect on public opinion and legislative response).
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (e)-(o).
15. It should be noted that this is an extraordinarily stringent flexibility
mechanism. The Endangered Species Committee exemption process requires
cabinet-level officials to make findings on the basis of four, very demanding
criteria. Id. § 1536(h)(1). The statute provides, in relevant part,
The Committee shall grant an exemption... if,
by a vote of not less
than five of its members voting in person (A) it determines on the record ...

that -

(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency
action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of
alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the species or
its critical habitat, and such action is in the public interest;
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance; and
(iv) neither the Federal agency concerned nor the exemption applicant
made any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources...
and
(B) it establishes such reasonable mitigation and enhancement
measures, including, but not limited to, live propagation,
transplantation, and habitat acquisition and improvement, as are
necessary and appropriate to minimize the adverse effects of the
agency action upon the endangered species, threatened species, or
critical habitat concerned.

Id.
16. Before 1978-the year TVA v. Hill was decided-the EPA made
critical habitat determinations solely on the basis of biological criteria. Under
the current provision, while a "core" area must be designated solely on the
basis of biological criteria, any area beyond that necessary to prevent
extinction must be subject to a balancing test-the Secretary is required to
consider whether the economic benefits of not designating those areas will
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Later, in 1982, Congress expanded section 10 to provide an
exception to section 9's taking prohibition and allow for certain
incidental takes of endangered species as long as accompanied
by an HCP and other required features.' 7 Facing major reform
legislation in the 104th Congress, the Clinton administration
further softened the rough edges of the statute by promoting
and enhancing administrative mechanisms such as the "no
surprises" policy,' 8 the "safe harbors" policy,1 9 candidate
conservation agreements,20 low-effect HCPs, 2 1 and multiexceed the biological benefits of designation.
STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL

Id. § 1533 (b)(2); see 'also

LAW SOCIETY, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

67-68 (2001).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1).
The Secretary may permit, under such terms and conditions as he
shall prescribe...
(B) any taking otherwise prohibited by section 1538(a)(1)(B) of this
title if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.
(2)(A) No permit may be issued by the Secretary authorizing any
taking referred to in paragraph (1)(B) unless the applicant therefore
submits to the Secretary a conservation plan [HCP that specifies (i) the impact which will likely result from such taking;
(ii) what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such
impacts, and the funding that will be available to implement such
steps;
(iii) what alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered
and the reasons why such alternatives are not being utilized; and
(iv) such other measures that the Secretary may require as being
necessary or appropriate for purposes of the plan.
(B) If the Secretary finds, after opportunity for public comment, with
respect to a permit application and the related conservation plan that
(i) the taking will be incidental;
(ii) the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize
and mitigate the impacts of such taking;
(iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan will
be provided;
(iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the
survival and recovery of the species in the wild ... the Secretary shall
issue the permit.
Id.
18. "No surprises" agreements assure landowners holding section 10
permits that upon completion of an HCP they will face no further obligations
toward any covered species. If approved actions turn out to harm species, the
government, not the landowner, will pay for any necessary adjustments. 50
C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(5)-(6), 17.32(b)(5)-(6), 222.22(g)-(h).
19. "Safe harbor" agreements assure landowners who improve species
habitat that additional obligations will not be imposed if the new or improved
habitat attracts additional species, and that no liability will ensue if the
habitat is later returned to a minimum baseline. 64 Fed. Reg. 32,706 (1999).
20. The goal of the Candidate Conservation Agreement policy is to protect
unlisted species by providing incentives for non-federal landowners and land
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22

species HCPs.
The ESA has evolved to the extent that we can now have
an informed debate about whether the program, as currently
configured, is overprotective or underprotective of endangered
and threatened species-and the story is not over.
Controversies surrounding species such as the Delhi-Sands
Flower-loving fly 23 and the Klamath sucker fish 24-political
management agencies to maintain, restore, or enhance habitat for those
species. See id.
21. Low-effect HCPs are determined by the Fish and Wildlife Service to
require lesser levels of protection.
22. See Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem
For a lively and
Management, 81 MINN. L REV. 869, 960-71 (1997).
informative discussion of the 104th Congress and Clinton administration
reforms, see Donald J. Barry, Opportunity in the Face of Danger: The
PragmaticDevelopment of HabitatConservationPlans, 4 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 129, 131 (1998) (relating the author's experiences in
promoting innovative arrangements under the ESA). For a discussion of the
growth in HCP approvals during the Clinton administration and other
features of ESA evolution, see Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A
Lesson for Conservationfrom Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism
for Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 45,
73-78 (2002) (highlighting the role of the ESA's section 4(d) in promoting
federal/state conservation efforts).
23. Protection of a small colony of endangered Delhi Sands flower-loving
flies in San Bernardino County, California, has given rise to the modification
of certain development proposals and has generated constitutional litigation
and considerable press attention. See, e.g., William Booth, Developers Wish
Rare Fly Would Buzz Off, WASH. POST, April 4, 1997, at Al; Imran Ghori,
Officials Air Views Over Fly Controversy, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE RIVERSIDE,
Nov. 21, 2002, at B3; Ellen Braunstein, Cities Hope to Swat Flies, THE PRESSENTERPRISE RIVERSIDE, Sept. 26, 2002, at B1; Ellen Braunstein, Fly Dispute
Swats Ballpark Project, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE RIVERSIDE, Sept. 24, 2002, at
B8; Ellen Braunstein, Rare Fly Seen at Sports Complex Site, THE PRESSENTERPRISE RIVERSIDE, Aug. 22, 2002, at B1; Roberto Hernandez, Insect May
Get Its Own "Land Bank": Plan Would Give Delhi Sands Fly 75 Acres in
Colton, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE RIVERSIDE, Nov. 11, 2000, at B1; Bruce
Ritchie, Shelter For Ugly and Open Debate: Endangered Species Law Protects
Both the Pretty and Mundane, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE RIVERSIDE, Mar. 15,
1999, at B1; David G. Savage, Buzz over a Fly Presents Challenge to Species
Act Environment, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1998, at Al; Onell Soto, Supreme Court
Swats Fly's Foes, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE RIVERSIDE, June 23, 1998, at Al;
Sandra Stokley, Court Backs EndangeredFly in Suit by Inland Officials, THE
PRESS-ENTERPRISE RIVERSIDE, Dec. 10, 1997, at Al.
The National Association of Home Builders invoked the Commerce Clause
to challenge the application of the ESA to this intrastate colony of flies. The
D.C. Circuit upheld the application of the statute, and the Supreme Court has
denied certiorari. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041
(D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied 524 U.S. 937 (1998). For discussions of intrastate
endangered species and the Commerce Clause, see John Copeland Nagle, The
Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV.
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heirs to the snail darter-already are serving as rallying points
for advocates of statutory change in the twenty-first century.
Was the ESA, as originally drafted, unsustainable-an
example of a draconian statute which repeatedly has
generated, and continues to generate, backlash that
undermines the statute's original commands? Should we view
current regulatory policies as unexamined products of bipolar
warring factions, 25 saved at the last minute from annihilation
by emergency measures during the Clinton administration, or,
alternatively, as part of an organic system of checks, balances,
and feedback mechanisms working as would be expected in a
democratic society? In light of these observations, is the
underenforcement of section 9 reflective of an unsustainable
environmental regulation, or could it be viewed as an example
of the importance of prosecutorial discretion not to enforce a
statute in unwarranted situations? Does the dearth of jeopardy
opinions 26 under section 7 represent underenforcement of an

174 (1998). See also Bradford Mank, ProtectingIntrastate ThreatenedSpecies:
Does the EndangeredSpecies Act Encroachon TraditionalState Authority and
Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723 (2002);
Omar N. White, The Endangered Species Act's Precarious Perch: A
ConstitutionalAnalysis Under the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 215 (2000).
24. See, e.g., Michael Milstein, Draught Dread Rises in Klamath, THE
OREGONIAN, Feb. 21, 2003, at A-i; Michael Milstein, Groups Will Sue to Keep
Klamath Water for Fish, THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 31, 2003, at D-2.
25. In a review of Eco-pragmatism, Ruhl describes contemporary
environmental law as a "mish-mash of laws, regulations, judicial opinions, and
countless administrative decisions and policies," such that "the 'middle' in
environmental law is simply whatever the annihilation process leaves behind."
J.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist)Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist)Middle
in Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 523 (2000). Noting that
Farber "does not suggest that the political annihilation process landed
environmental law in a radically different place than Eco-pragmatism would
have found," Ruhl describes Farber's work as an attempt to find an a priori
sense of how the middle ground should look-a deliberate middle ground. Id.
at 523-34; see also Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Environmental
Tribalism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1099 (2003).
26. A World Wildlife Fund study has illustrated that many section 7
consultations between the FWS and other federal agencies have involved
rapid, informal consultations, many by telephone, and resulted in no delay or
modification of a project. Only 0.3% of all consultations during the five-year
period of the study resulted in jeopardy opinions. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND,
TALK IS CHEAPER THAN WE THINK: THE CONSULTATION PROCESS UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1994). In a review of jeopardy findings, Oliver A.
Houck found that most permitted projects proceed with minimal conditions,
such as signs reading "'don't dredge while the eagles are nesting,' speed limit
signs in manatee waters, and a wider median strip in a federal highway
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unreasonable statute, or provide an example of the availability
of administrative discretion to negotiate mitigative strategies?
Plater, discussing rules and their consequences, notes that
strict rules invariably lead to calls for flexibility and variance
or exemption procedures, and most include or develop27
accommodations in location, timing, design, or technology.
Perhaps this is akin to the biological concept of negative
feedback, which tends to stabilize systems over time. 28 Plater
further observes that judicially enforceable substantive rules
accompanying relatively new civic values will engender the
greatest backlash, implying that various accommodations likely
will diminish resistance over time. 29 Although the latter point
is unclear with regard to the ESA, regulatory takings
jurisprudence may bear this out, as some courts have
determined that notice of established regulatory programs
should lead to diminished expectations, and buyers' reduced
30
prices will have accounted for this diminution.
routed through wolf habitat to enable wolves to pause safely while crossing."
Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the
U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 326
(1993); see also Oliver A. Houck, Reflections on the Endangered Species Act, 25
ENVTL. L. 689, 692 (1995).
27. ZYGMUNT B. PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLIcY 699-700 (2d
ed. 1998).
28. The concept of feedback loops in the biological sciences may provide a
helpful analogy. In a feedback loop, information about the result of an action
is transmitted back to the system in a manner that will either accelerate the
reaction in the same direction as the proceeding result (positive feedback), or
produce results in the opposite direction as the earlier results (negative
feedback).
See, e.g., J. de Rosnay, Principia Cybernetica Web, at
http://www.pespmcl.vub.ac.be/feedback.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). In a
negative loop, every variation toward a forward direction triggers a correction
backward, and vice versa. While positive feedback theoretically leads to
exponential growth or decline, negative feedback works to stabilize a system
over time. Id. One commentator has compared negative feedback loops to a
water tank equipped with a float. Id. When the water reaches a certain level,
the float sends a signal that will close the flow of water until it is lowered
again. At the grave risk of comparing our cherished constitutional system of
checks and balances to the operation of a toilet tank, the example is
instructive in that it suggests that a systems perspective might help inform
the processes leading to eco-pragmatic outcomes.
29. PLATER, supra note 27, at 700.
30. For example, in Forest Properties,Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999), the Federal Circuit determined that the Army Corps's
denial of a dredge and fill permit under § 404 of the Clean Water Act did not
amount to a compensable taking, despite the fact that the developer had
received the necessary state permits. In applying the Penn Central test, the
court found that Forest Properties lacked reasonable investment-backed
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The ESA experience suggests that the political process
itself may exhibit many attributes of pragmatism-in
particular, a reliance on experimentation and feedback as an
approach to problem solving, and the integration of differing
perspectives. 31 As we search for analytical frameworks to guide
future decision making, we should recognize that a well-defined
environmental baseline that comes to embrace economic values
over time may be different from, but not necessarily inferior to,
one that is structured by experts seeking to blend potentially
competing value premises at the outset. As a corollary,
statutes with seemingly unequivocal baseline commands
should be viewed, not in isolation, but as part of a dynamic
system of formal and informal incentives-a dialectical process
in which regulators, the regulated, courts, and interest groups
engage in cost-benefit balancing, of their own, responding to a
mix of market and governmental signals-in the process,
changing the original programmatic' construct.
Only by
viewing statutes from a dynamic or systems perspective 32 can
expectations because, when the company bought the land in 1988, Corps
guidelines "had been in effect for a number of years." Id. at 1366. The
guidelines "made it clear that filling wetlands to construct housing on the
reclaimed land was disfavored and that it was most unlikely that such a
project would be approved." Id. Quoting its 1994 decision in Creppel v. United
States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the court stated,
The investment-based expectation criterion "limits recovery to owners
who can demonstrate that they bought their property in reliance on
the non-existence of the challenged regulation. One who buys with
knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic loss."
Id. at 1367 (emphasis added); see also Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that Army Corps guidelines which prevented a
landowner from developing his land did not constitute a taking because the
landowner was "aware at the time of purchase of the need for regulatory
approval to develop his land" and "[h]e must also be presumed to have been
aware of the greater general concern for environmental matters"). For the
Supreme Court's recent treatment of the notice question in takings law, see
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634-35 (2001) (O'Conner; J.,
concurring) (stating that notice is a relevant, albeit not dispositive, element in
the analysis of investment-backed expectations).
31. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 462-512
(1938).
32. A premise of systems dynamics, which uses concepts drawn from the
natural sciences (particularly feedback control) to understand change in social
and economic systems, is that "the inherent conflict between immediate and
ultimate consequences is not given its proper weight in management and
political decisions." Jay W. Forrester, System Dynamics and the Lessons of 35
Years, in THE SYSTEMIC BASIS OF POLICY MAKING IN THE 1990S, at 27 (Kenyon

B. De Greene ed., 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Minnesota
Law Review).
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we evaluate the relative efficiencies of command-and-control
and various alternatives, 33 and better understand the synergy
between command and innovation.
II. ECOPRAGMATISM'S NORMATIVE ASPECT
As the above suggests, a statute with an untempered
assertion of environmental values ultimately may result in a
regulatory regime that successfully integrates economic
considerations to the satisfaction of the eco-pragmatist. In this
section I consider whether, as Eco-pragmatism suggests, new
environmental regimes should best
be constructed around the
'34
principle of a "deliberate middle.
A priori, there might be various advantages to starting in
the middle. First, it might be argued that in today's political
world a new environmental program embodying an unyielding
regulatory regime would be a "nonstarter." Second, it might be
said that an alternative regime would not endure over the long
term, or that the result would be a patchwork of ad hoc and
35
inconsistent decisions vulnerable to shifting political tides.
Third, it could be argued that, even if a statute like the ESA got
to the right place in the end (or aims to get there), it would
have arrived more quickly and/or cheaply had we started in the
middle.
As the following suggests, however, real world experience
may call into question whether starting from a deliberate
middle will be optimal from either an environmental or an
33.

Daniel H. Cole and Peter Z. Grossman, analyzing the relative

efficiencies

of command-and-control

and alternatives

from a historical,

technological, and institutional perspective, have taken an important step in
this direction. See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Commandand-Control Efficient?
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative
Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection,

1999 Wis L. REV. 887, 888 (illustrating certain overlooked efficiencies of
traditional command-and-control regulatory schemes); see also Howard Latin,
Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards and "Fine-Tuning"Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267

(1985) (suggesting that command-and-control regulation has fostered
significant improvements in environmental quality at a societal cost that has
not proved prohibitive).

34.

In discussing the "deliberate middle," I am referring to Eco-

pragmatism's goal

of charting

a

course

that

merges

economic

and

environmental considerations before the subsequent bargaining processes
inevitably occur. I recognize that Farber starts with a presumption in favor of
the environment, but that presumption may be tempered by a feasibility
analysis at the outset. See discussion infra note 46 and accompanying text.
35. See FARBER, supra note 2, at 13.
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efficiency perspective. Eco-pragmatism's unassailable goal of
integrating environmental and economic values may be
achieved from other starting points.
A. PREMISES

One of the simplest and yet most important messages of
Eco-pragmatism is the concept of social sustainability. The
book begins with the premise that, to be sustainable,
only
not
accommodate
must
law
environmental
environmentalism, but other key values; otherwise, it will
trigger backlash and ultimately will erode:
The ultimate challenge for environmental law is social
sustainability ....Otherwise, we will have a regulatory structure
that is too draconian for us to live with in the long run. Only by
acknowledging the claims of both the public and private spheres can
we hope to create a durable scheme of environmental protection.
Without appealing to public values, environmental regulations could
not long enjoy general support .... But without recognizing private
interests as legitimate, environmental regulations may provoke
unmanageable resistance from those paying the price and are likely
to be seen by society as a whole as too draconian to be acceptable.
Long-term, sustainable environmental regulations must appeal to
while recognizing the significance of economic interests
public values,
36
as well.

The other key premise is the importance of maintaining an
environmental baseline-a presumption, albeit rebuttable, in
favor of protecting the environment. 37 Farber has left us much
room to flesh out the meaning of the baseline, recognizing that
"[i]t is one thing to endorse an environmentalist baseline and
another to work out how such a baseline should apply."3 8 One
question left unresolved is whether the baseline should be a
measure of environmental quality, such as ecosystem
biodiversity or a level of air or water quality, or whether it
should be a behavioral mandate such that the "taking"
prohibition of ESA section 9 or the "no jeopardy" requirement of
section 7. In other words, an unresolved issue is whether the
environmental baseline is an affirmative standard to which we
should aspire, a statutory mandate that we should obey, or
some kind of a default mechanism that will be triggered if

36. Id. at 12, 58.
37. Id. at 94, 114. "Our society has basic commitments, including one to
environmental quality, and those commitments should form the baseline for
analysis." Id. at 94.
38. Id. at 114.
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certain context-specific obligations are not met. 39
Ruhl suggests that the baseline conditions of the ESA
consist of listed species and their critical habitats,4 0 and finds
the practical behavioral expression of the baseline in the "no
jeopardy" mandate of section 7.41 I would argue that we might
have a three-way tie among Ruhl's suggested baseline, section
7's statutory mandate, or the "taking" prohibition of section 9.
Alternatively, perhaps one could identify an affirmative
behavioral mandate, such as the responsibility to conserve
species in section 7(a)(1), 42 or the ESA's overarching goal of
preserving ecosystems in section 2(b).43 This uncertainty
among possible baselines suggests that the baseline concept
needs further elaboration before we can design appropriate
safeguarding mechanisms.
B. THE HYBRID APPROACH
One of the principal methods that Farber advocates for
protecting the environmental baseline is the "hybrid approach"
which involves feasibility analysis with cost-benefit analysis as
a backstop: "[W]e need to adopt a baseline rule of eliminating
environmental risks as much as feasible. Only when the costs
are grossly disproportionate to the benefits should we abandon
44
this baseline."
39. See discussion infra notes 77-104 and accompanying text.
40. Ruhl, supra note 11, at 908-13.
41. Id. at 910-15.

42.

Section 7(a)(1) states, in relevant part, "All other Federal agencies

shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize

their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out
programs for the conservation of endangered
species .... 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2002).

43.

species

and

threatened

Section 2(b) notes, in relevant part, that "[t]he purposes of this

chapter are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved." Id. §

1531(b).
44. FARBER, supra note 2, at 12.
[RIather than approaching each case anew, we should start from the

environmental norms that our society has unmistakably embraced.

In concrete terms, this analysis translates into strong reliance on the
feasibility approach to regulation .... Although "feasible" in some
sense of the word, achievement of an environmental goal may

sometimes involve costs that are grossly disproportionate to any
plausible benefit. Thus, cost-benefit analysis may serve as a useful
backstop for feasibility analysis to handle these situations. We
should always begin, however, with a presumption in favor of
protecting the environment except where infeasible or grossly
disproportionate to benefits.
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A possible criticism of the hybrid approach is that it
conflates the normative concept of an environmental baseline
with a practical methodology for protecting it-a methodology
that, in some cases, may be ill-suited to the task. Furthermore,
whether the approach is sufficiently protective may depend on
the context and timing of the analysis-whether cost and
feasibility considerations are to be considered before statutory
enactment, included in statutory language, or even considered
years later, after a regulatory program has sufficiently evolved.
In essence, the implications of cost and feasibility
considerations may vary considerably, depending on where we
set the zoom or snap the photo. A brief look at the ESA and the
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) may be
instructive, as they represent two of the most significant efforts
to establish environmental baselines in our existing regulatory
scheme.
1. Health-Based Standards: The NAAQS and the Hybrid
Approach
If integrated into statutory language, the feasibility
approach would appear to exclude health-based environmental
standards such as the NAAQS. 4 5 The NAAQS, which establish
acceptably safe levels of pollutants in the ambient air,
represent one of the strongest legislative efforts to establish an
environmental baseline in all of pollution control law. Section
109 of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires primary NAAQS to be
set at the level "which in the judgment of the Administrator,
margin
based on [air quality] criteria and allowing an adequate
46
of safety, are requisite to protect the public health."
Drawing upon statutory language and legislative history,
courts consistently have reaffirmed that EPA must exclude
consideration of industry compliance costs and technological
Id. at 94.
45. Health-based standards such as the NAAQS require regulators to
establish permissibly safe levels for particular pollutants in the ambient
environment.
In the case of the NAAQS, when these standards are
implemented, emission limits are allocated among individual sources of
pollution-the total area-wide loadings of the pollutant must not exceed the
concentration established in the health-based standard.
The air quality criteria must
46. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2002).
"accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind
and extent of all identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be
expected from the presence of such pollutant[s] in the ambient air." Id. §
7408(a)(2).
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In
feasibility from the NAAQS standard-setting process.
upholding the NAAQS for airborne lead in 1980, the D.C.
Circuit stated that "Congress made it abundantly clear that
considerations of economic or technological feasibility are to be
subordinated to the goal of protecting the public health."47 In
2001, when the question of compliance costs arose in
conjunction with the nondelegation challenge to the NAAQS in
Whitman v. American Trucking,48 Justice Scalia, writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court, reiterated that "[t]he text of section
109(b), interpreted in its statutory and historical context and
with appreciation for its importance to the CAA as a whole,
unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQSsetting process, and thus ends the matter for us as well as the
EPA."49 Under the NAAQS framework, cost and feasibility
considerations may come into play later, during the
implementation phase, when individual states allocate
emissions among the various polluting sources. 50 Although the
command-and-control regulatory paradigm embodied by the
CAA has no shortage of critics, 5 1 emissions of nearly all of the
most pervasive air pollutants in the U.S. have decreased
dramatically since the 1970s, despite substantial growth in
47.

Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

"[T]he absence of any provision requiring consideration of these factors was no
accident; it was the result of a deliberate decision by Congress to subordinate
such concerns to the achievement of health goals." Id. at 1149.
48. 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001).
49. Id.at 471.
50. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 266 (1976).
Perhaps the most important forum for consideration of claims of
economic and technological infeasibility, is before the state agency
formulating the implementation plan.
So long as the national
standards are met, the State may select whatever mix of control

devices it desires, and industries with particular economic or
technological problems may seek special treatment in the plan itself.
Moreover, if the industry is not exempted from, or accommodated by,

the original plan, it may obtain a variance, as petitioner did in this
case; and the variance, if granted after notice and a hearing, may be
submitted to the EPA as a revision of the plan. Lastly, an industry
denied an exemption from the implementation plan, or denied a

subsequent variance, may be able to take its claims of economic or
technological infeasibility to the state courts.

Id. at 266-67 (citations omitted). Total emissions loadings for designated
pollutants in each region, however, must fall within the federally established
health-based limits.
51. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1341 (1985); Richard B. Stewart,
United States EnvironmentalRegulation:A FailingParadigm,15 J.L. & COM.

585, 585 (1996).
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52
population, vehicle use, and economic activity.
Does the NAAQS-setting process comport with the hybrid
approach? If technological feasibility were integrated during
the standard-setting phase, we would lose the concept of a pure
health-based standard entirely. If the NAAQS program were to
be evaluated later, during the implementation phase, the
program would likely pass muster under a feasibility test.
Arbitrarily changing the zoom in this manner, however, calls
into question whether the hybrid approach has value, a priori,
as a decision-making guide.

2. The ESA and the Hybrid Approach
Similarly, had Congress tempered the language of sections
7 and 9 of the ESA to permit a balancing of feasibility
considerations at the outset, the prospect of meaningful
protection of endangered species would be limited. With a
discretionary standard, prohibitions on taking or jeopardizing
species on the brink of extinction would be difficult or
impossible to enforce by regulators and third-party litigants
alike. 53
Interestingly, "practicability" language in two
statutory precursors to the ESA-the Endangered Species
Endangered Species
Preservation Act of 1966 and the
the laws' effectiveness
of
1969-diminished
Conservation Act
his Environmental
Nixon,
in
that
President
the
extent
to
Message of 1972, concluded that existing law "simply does not
provide the kind of management tools needed to act early
54
enough to save a vanishing species."

52. According to EPA data, with the exception of nitrogen oxides, which
increased by 6%, emissions of the most pervasive air pollutants have declined
dramatically between

1970 and 1995: lead emissions dropped by 98%;

particulate matter emissions from industrial activity and fuel combustion
declined by 79%; sulfur dioxide emissions by 41%, carbon monoxide emissions
by 28% (even though total vehicle miles traveled more than doubled between
1970 and 1995); and volatile organic compounds by 25%. J. CLARENCE DAVIES

& JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING
THE SYSTEM 58 (1998). During this period, national ambient concentrations of

all of the criteria pollutants subject to the NAAQS regime have declined. Id.
at 60.
53. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 15311543; Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83
Stat. 275. These earlier statutes conditioned federal agency obligations to
avoid adverse impacts on endangered species upon consideration of what was
"practicable" and "consistent with the primary purpose" of the agencies. Id.
54. MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 198 (1997).
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Application of a feasibility standard to the ESA today
would limit its potency considerably. Perhaps one could argue
that Congress undertook a feasibility analysis before drafting
the statute, when the initial decision was made to limit the
ESA's protection to endangered or threatened species, despite
the statute's broader goal of protecting ecosystems.
Alternatively, if one is permitted to change the zoom and apply
a feasibility test after the statue has sufficiently evolved, we
are again left to ponder55 the value of the hybrid approach as a
decision-making guide.
3. Sequence Matters
If feasibility considerations are incorporated at the outset,
we may be trading away certain environmental benefits that
could be achieved were they addressed in a more limited
manner or at a later point, as in the case of the NAAQS.
Where Farber views feasibility standards as sufficiently
protective of an environmental baseline, they may in some
cases serve to reflect the status quo. 56 Feasibility standards
are just that-they are based on prevailing technology and
often on industry's own estimates of expected compliance costs,
which, as history shows, may far outpace actual costs. 57 By
conflating the environmental baseline with a feasibility
standard, we may overestimate the costs of environmental
protection, because the baseline itself might otherwise serve to
motivate industry's powers of technological innovation and cost
containment-producing new technologies and systems
unimaginable at the standard-setting stage. 58 To maintain the
environmental baseline, we may need a behavior-forcing rule
up front-the "eco" first and then the "pragmatism," as it were.
55. See supra Part I.A.
56. Feasible means "'capable of being done, executed or effected,"' both
technologically and economically. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 508-09 (1976) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 831 (1976)).

NEW

INTERNATIONAL

57. For example, OSHA predicted that the cotton dust standard would
cost $500 million in 1977 dollars, whereas industry predicted twice the cost
and anticipated substantial technical hurdles. A later study indicated that the
standard cost only $250 million in 1983 dollars and provided greater health
benefits than anticipated and competitiveness gains for industry.
Occupational Exposure to Cotton Dust, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,121, 51,164-67 (Dec.
13, 1985); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 479 (3d ed. 2000).

58. See discussion of vehicle emission rules infra note 60-62 and
accompanying text.
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In other words, sequence matters.5 9
The following example illustrates that a feasibility
standard, applied at the outset, can be a limiting concept. The
1970 CAA directed automotive manufacturers to curtail
emissions of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide from new
vehicles by 90% within five years. 60 This was considered
draconian at the time, as no technologies were available to
achieve this reduction. 6' In response to the rule, however, the
auto industry produced the catalytic converter which was able
to achieve the necessary reduction. 62
Had technological
feasibility been considered at the outset, Congress may never
have enacted this standard, which, as it turned out (albeit with
blood, sweat, and tears) was feasible.
In this manner,
feasibility may present a chicken-and-egg problem-we may
not know what is feasible until certain pressure points are
applied. The experience with catalytic converters illustrates
that an unequivocal rule can generate innovation and modify
the parameters of feasibility itself.
III. TAKING SLIPPAGE SERIOUSLY
On inspection it appears that eco-pragmatists themselves
appreciate that a strong statutory mandate will, in the real
world, be seen as a first step in a process, and not the ultimate
enforcement criterion. This reinforces the importance of asking
the question, what form should the opening maneuver in an
extended bargaining process take?
In Taking Slippage Seriously, published two years after
Eco-pragmatism, Farber introduces new concepts that may call
into question whether it is always best to start from a
deliberate middle. The slippage concept expresses the disparity
between environmental regulatory mandates and actual
enforcement. 63 Negative slippage includes lax enforcement,
missed deadlines by regulators or regulated parties, and
noncompliance by regulated parties. 64 Affirmative or positive
59. This perspective on the importance of sequencing in environmental
standards was developed in conversations with Kirsten Engel, Senior Attorney
at the Public Protection Bureau of the Massachusetts Office of Attorney
General, former Associate Professor of Law at Tulane Law School.
60. PERCIVAL, supra note 57, at 607.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Farber, supra note 5, at 298.

64. Id. at 299.
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slippage occurs when regulators help design alternatives to
compliance with statutory mandates. 65 This includes decisions
to substitute formal standards with negotiated agreements on a
case-by-case basis.
Taking slippage into account, Farber notes that
environmental standards often are merely the "opening
gambits in a prolonged bargaining process" between agencies
and regulated parties, rather than endpoints of compliance. 66
What looks like a regulatory command is only one stage in a
larger and more flexible process-"the dynamics of the
implementation process" cannot be ignored. 67 He notes that the
fact that the standards are sometimes too harsh, with
compliance costs outweighing the benefits, may be perfectly
rational. The standards "may merely be the government's
opening demand in negotiations, and the final bargain is likely
to be more favorable to the other side." 68 Thus, the criticism
that regulatory standards are too harsh loses some of its force.
Farber elaborates upon various efficiencies operating outside of
the regulatory structure that may prevent the inefficient
application of strict rules:
A source with unusually high compliance costs has a greater incentive
to resist government demands, while those costs may also have
political ramifications such as lost jobs or a declining tax base that
might limit the government's regulatory enthusiasm.

On the other

hand, high environmental impacts will create more pressure on the
government for enforcement of the standards, and increase the
likelihood of a citizen suit. Consequently, we might expect that
enforcement (and thus the ultimate outcome) will be strictest for
sources with low compliance costs and high environmental impacts,
and weakest for sources with high costs and low impacts. As a result,

the costs and benefits of pollution control will be roughly matched,
rather than making the level of pollution control independent of

individual circumstances.6 9

Jason Johnston observes similar efficiencies operating in
the shadow of the formal regulatory structure. In evaluating
the effect of interest groups on enforcement, Johnston notes
that regional and local variation in the implementation of
ostensibly uniform federal environmental laws is exactly what
Congress intended-and is a function of regulators' own cost-

65.

Id. at 307.

66.
67.

Id. at 316-17.
Id. at 317-18.

68.

Id. at 316.

69.

Id.
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benefit calculations and incentives. 70
Likewise, he
acknowledges the give-and-take between regulators and
Congress as an additional impetus for considering regulatory
costs outside the formal framework. If an environmental
regulator's own preferences ignore the costs of regulation,
actual regulation may be determined by the congressional
71
oversight function.
IV. THE SYNERGY BETWEEN COMMAND
AND INNOVATION
At first glance, recent market-based and "contractarian" 72
experiments in developing incentive-based alternatives to
traditional command-and-control systems might be presumed
to be antithetical to the command paradigm. On review,
however, they might provide additional support for the
continuing importance of clear baseline commands. In the
market-based or market-enlisting approach, efficiencies are
said to be achieved through the marketplace, while in the
contractarian approach, efficiencies are achieved through caseby-case negotiations and agreements between regulators and
the regulated. 73 HCPs, Project XL, and SEPs fit into the
70. Jason Scott Johnston, The Law and Economics of Environmental
Contracts, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO
REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 291 (Eric W.

Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001).
[RIegulators implement and enforce regulations based on the
perceived net benefit of the regulation. That is, even if promulgated
regulations apply to a particular industry, they will not be enforced as
promulgated if the regulator perceives low net benefits of
enforcement. One thing that can account for low perceived net
benefits is high perceived costs ....
[C]osts include not only direct
compliance costs but also threatened job losses and impaired
international competitiveness.
Id.
71. Id. at 293. "If the regulator pushes too far in the environmental
direction, members of Congress who represent" regulated parties may respond
with oversight hearings, possible budget reductions, or substantive legislation.
Id.; see also Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal
Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
348, 348-76 (1999); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC.
165, 165-76 (1984).
72. See David A. Dana, The New "Contractarian" Paradigm in
Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 36.
73. Id. at 37. See also Johnston, supra note 70, at 271-72, which states
that
[elnvironmental contracts are typically "voluntary" in a formal legal
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contractarian model, while emissions trading programs, such
as the CAA's acid rain program, comport with the marketbased or market-enlisting model.
These public/private arrangements exhibit qualities
similar to those sought through an eco-pragmatic analytic
framework. They would not operate successfully, however,
"but for" the existence of clear, statutory commands that may
or may not comport with Eco-pragmatism's hybrid approach.
The most successful emissions trading programs to date have
depended upon strong regulatory baseline requirements: caps
on total allowable emissions. Contractarian approaches, by
definition, have default regulatory regimes, 74 some of which
might be considered draconian and unsustainable under Ecopragmatism'sanalytical framework.
A. NEW CONTRACTARIAN APPROACHES AND STATUTORY
DEFAULTS

HCPs, Project XL, and the SEPs program-examples of the
contractarian approach-illustrate the continued viability of
the strong baseline, at least as a default. While some
commentators maintain that contractarian regimes capitalize
on the
inefficiencies
of command-and-control, 75 the
transformation of mandatory rules into default rules reflects
the political system's ability to create incentives that could not
arise in the absence of a credible threat of enforcement of an
76
underlying rule.
David Dana's use of the term, "contractarian regulation,"
sense and yet negotiated against the background of the status quo
regulatory outcome that would otherwise obtain. A basic lesson from
both game theory and the economic analysis of contracts is that the
status quo or default outcome that will obtain if the parties don't
reach agreement on a particular point will be a crucial determinant of
their strategic behavior in bargaining to reach agreement.
Environmental contracts are both contractual and regulatory.... But
environmental contracts are also an alternative to traditional
regulation.
74. Dana, supra note 72, at 47.
75. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 70, at 286-87; Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 943 (2003).
For an interesting discussion of the causal relationship between
Farber's concepts of negative and positive slippage in the form of reinvention
programs, see Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game-Theoretic Approach to Regulatory
Negotiation and a Framework for Empirical Analysis, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 33, 43-44 (2002).

76. See discussion infra notes 81-99 and accompanying text.
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embodies the synthesis of regulation and innovation in these
arrangements:
In the absence of the threat of the application of the default regime of
command-and-control regulation, regulated entities would lack any
economic incentives to negotiate alternative regulatory arrangements
such as HCPs.... [I]n fact, we do not observe any contractarian
regulatory activity where there are no applicable background
command-and-control regulations in place or plausibly threatened to
be in place. Thus, although it is true that contractarian regulation is
a reform alternative to command-and-control regulation, it is also
true that command-and-control
regulation is a precondition for
77
contractarian regulation.

Geoffery Hazard and Eric Orts similarly speak of
environmental contracts as a form of regulation, or "regulatory
contracts," noting that the line between contracts and
regulation is not always clear in practice-blurring the
distinction between public and private law. 78 According to
Hazard and Orts, the differences between contract and
regulation, while real and important, are differences in degree
rather than kind. 79 Likewise, Carol Rose has argued that "the
public/private divide, taken alone, misses the substantive
content" of various techniques or strategies of regulation.8 0
1. ESA Section 9 and Habitat Conservation Plans
As noted above, section 9 of the ESA has provided the
regulatory incentive for developing site-specific negotiated
agreements in the form of HCPs under section 10.
Interestingly, Congress amended section 10 in 1982 in response
to a negotiation generated by the potential application of
section 9 to a proposed development project in endangered
Mission Blue butterfly habitat. 81 In theory, if the government
77. Dana, supra note 72, at 47.
78. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Eric W. Orts, Environmental Contracts in
the United States, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS, supra note 70, at 76-77.
79. Id.
80. Carol Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management
Strategiesfor Common Resources, 1 DUKE L.J. 8-9 (1991), in ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTRACTS, supra note 70, at 77.
81. Congress amended section 10 as a means of authorizing and
validating a negotiated agreement resolving a dispute involving commercial
development of San Bruno Mountain on the San Francisco peninsula. The
various stakeholders had reached an agreement that would allow a limited
number of incidental takes of the endangered Mission Blue butterfly in
exchange for preserving and enhancing the remaining habitat. Because no
ESA provision authorized the Fish and Wildlife Service to permit such a take,
Congress added the incidental take permit provision to section 10, Endangered
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and landowners cannot negotiate an HCP, landowners are open
to suit under section 9. Donald Barry, former assistant
secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks at the Department of
Interior, has noted that the mere existence of the section 9
threat-potential civil and criminal penalties and the presence
of a citizen suit provision-has made it more potent as a
facilitator than the actual number of enforcement actions
would suggest.82 Two years after publishing Eco-pragmatism,
Farber, in discussing various efforts to reinvent environmental
regulation, similarly noted the essential role of section 9 in
motivating the negotiation of HCPs: "The newer initiatives...
build on the older approach. Without the background threat of
Sweet Home, negotiations
regulatory enforcement upheld in
83
incentives."
of
lack
for
fail
would
84
Building on the literature of environmental contracting
and default rules,8 5 Brad Karkkainen's contribution to this
Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (1982),
and the FWS subsequently approved the San Bruno Mountain plan as the first
MICHAEL J. BEAN ET AL., RECONCILING CONFLICTS UNDER THE
HCP.
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING
EXPERIENCE 52-55 (1991); see also Jennifer Jester, Habitat Conservation
Plans Under Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act: The Alabama Beach
Mouse and the Unfulfilled Mandate of Species Recovery, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 131, 158-59 (1998); Albert C. Lin, Participants'Experiences with
Habitat ConservationPlans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23
ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 375-76 (1996).
82. See Barry, supra note 22, at 130-31.
83. Daniel A. Farber, A Tale of Two Cases, 20 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 33, 45
(2001).
84. See, e.g., Dana, supra note 72, at 36; Johnston, supra note 70, at 304.
For a discussion of the San Bruno Mountain HCP as an example of
environmental contracting, see Johnston, supra note 70, at 273-75.
85. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989);
Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 825 (1992); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the
Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 444 (1993). Steven J. Ware
provides helpful commentary on the distinction between default rules and
mandatory, or immutable, rules. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From
Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV.
703, 706 (1999). Default rules are government-created rights and duties that
are privatizable, but they will govern unless parties contract out of them. Id.
Mandatory rules are government-created rights and duties that cannot be
avoided by contract. Id. at 706. Ware argues that although the prevailing
view is that the preponderance of state and federal law consists of mandatory
rules and is therefore not privatizable, much of what is widely-believed to be
mandatory is effectively default and privatizable. Id. at 707; see also W. David
Slawson, The Futile Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 29. 29 (1994).
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Symposium describes how section 9 has emerged as a
subspecies of default rule to which a penalty attaches: a
regulatory penalty default.8 6 The literature characterizes
default rules as mandatory rules that are privatizable-the
rules will govern unless parties contract around them by
bargaining with regulators. 87 Default rules therefore are
mandatory rules that can be reconfigured into incentive
systems when regulated entities are given the option to avoid
88
compliance through alternative negotiated arrangements.
Karkkainen notes that although the section 9 "no take"
prohibition initially was conceptualized as an ordinary
mandatory rule, it provided such potentially harsh
consequences for affected landowners that it was easily
converted into a penalty default by exploiting the variance
provision of section 10 already available in the statute. 89 He
describes the Clinton administration's aggressive expansion of
HCPs in the mid to late 1990s as an effort to reconfigure
conventional environmental regulation into a penalty default
regime. 90
In this process, the previously obscure permit
provision of section 10 was transformed into the "centerpiece of
[the administration's] endangered species and ecosystem
conservation policy."9 1 These contractual arrangements may
not have occurred but for the threat of section 9's strict taking
prohibition. While Karkkainen questions the efficiencies of the
underlying regulatory regime and recent administrative
responses, 92 he agrees with the deep logic of these new
arrangements, noting that they can be structured to result in a
more ambitious set of affirmative conservation measures than
would have been obtained through enforcement of the
93
prohibitory "do no harm" rule.

Farber describes the reconfiguring of mandatory rules into default rules
as an aspect of positive or affirmative slippage. Farber, supra note 5, at 31516 ("Often, so-called standards may serve as threat points in negotiation or as
penalty defaults that force information disclosure. The optimum 'standards'
for these purposes may well be quite different from (and often harsher than)
the ultimate performance level that we wish to attain.").
86. Karkkainen, supra note 75, at 944, 975-83.
87. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 85, at 706.
88. Id.
89. Karkkainen, supra note 75, at 972-73.
90. Id. at 970-75.
91. Id. at 970.
92. Id. at 983; see also Johnston, supra note 70, at 286-88.
93. Karkkainen, supra note 75, at 982-83.

2003]

THE PARADOX OF (ECO)PRAGMATISM

1061

2. Project XL
Like HCPs, other contractarian arrangements rely on a
regulatory default to motivate firms to negotiate alternative
means of promoting environmental results. The premise of
Project XL, a multi-media program developed by EPA in the
1990s, is that regulators and regulated entities will negotiate
site-specific environmentally-protective agreements to relieve
the regulated entities of relevant statutory requirements. 94 In
this manner, environmental contracting under Project XL is
premised on a regulatory default. Like HCPs, these negotiated
commitments are intended to produce results that are equal or
superior to performance under the relevant regulatory
requirements. Although Project XL has drawn substantial
criticism 9 5 and qualified praise, 96 it represents further support
for the principle that an enforceable regulatory backstop is an
essential ingredient of a viable environmental contracting
program.
3. Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs)
Supplemental Environmental Projects, or SEPs, another
94. Dana, supra note 72, at 40; see also Dennis D. Hirsch, Understanding
Project XL: A Comparative Legal and Policy Analysis, in ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTRACTS, supra note 70, at 115; Thomas E. Caballero, Project XL: Making
It Legal, Making It Work, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 399, 403 (1998); Bradford C.
Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency's Project XL and Other
Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Authorization, 25

ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 20 (1998); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation: The DangerousJourney from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 122-23 (1998).

95. To date, there have been few consummated XL agreements. Congress
has not enacted any statutory authorization for the XL program or developed
statutory standards for issuing XL permits. Critics claim that the XL
agreements give too much to business in return for uncertain environmental
benefits. In particular, there is confusion over the criteria the EPA uses in
determining whether a project will "'achieve environmental performance that
is superior to what would be achieved through compliance with current and
reasonably anticipated future regulation."' Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory
Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 ELR
10,527, 130-40 (1996) (quoting Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60
Fed. Reg. 27,282, 27,287 (May 23, 1995)); see also Steinzor, supra note 94, at
124 (discussing the shortcomings of various Project XL agreements and
attendant procedural problems).
96. See Dennis D. Hirsch, Project XL and the Special Case: The EPA's
Untold Success Story, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219, 222 (2001); Joshua
Secunda & Lawrence E. Susskind, "Improving"Project XL: Helping Adaptive
Management to Work Within EPA, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 155, 158
(1998-99).
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example of the contractarian approach, similarly illustrate the
synergy between regulation and bargained-for innovation.
SEPs are novel forms of settling enforcement actions for
violations of environmental regulations. 97 In these settlements,
the government and violators of pollution control statutes
negotiate agreements whereby the violator undertakes various
environmentally beneficial measures instead of paying a
monetary penalty. 98 Like HCPs and Project XL, the ability of
SEPs to satisfy process concerns and bring about measurable
environmental benefits is still in question. 99 But they
nevertheless exhibit a similar logic-the replacement of
regulatory requirements with negotiated, site-specific
agreements, relying on the regulatory requirement as a default
condition.
B. THE MARKET-BASED APPROACH AND STATUTORY CAPS:
SULFUR DIOXIDE EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAM

Market-based or market-enlisting programs like the Title
IV sulfur dioxide emissions trading program created by the
1990 amendments to the CAA rely on a system of regulatory
caps as well as monetary penalties for noncompliance. 10 0
Several commentators have emphasized the importance of the
regulatory cap and noncompliance sanctions as necessary
incentives to trade in a cost effective manner.1 01 In the sulfur
dioxide trading program, Congress set the initial cap at a level
that represented one half of existing power plan emission
levels1 02-a goal that might not have appeared feasible to
utilities at the time. The cost of pollution allowances, at least
97. Dana, supra note 72, at 43-44.
98. See id.
99. See David A. Dana, The Uncertain Merits of Environmental
Enforcement Reform: The Case of Supplemental EnvironmentalProjects, 1998
WIs. L. REV. 1181, 1191. See also Farber, supra note 5, at 309-11.
100. See, e.g., New Strategies for a New Market: The Electric Industry's
Response to the Environmental Protection Agency's Sulfur Dioxide Emission
Allowances Trading Program, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 469, 470-71 (1995)
[hereinafter New Strategies]. Because noncompliance must be prohibitively

unattractive for effective operation of the program, a penalty based on tonnage
excesses over a given year's allowances was included. See, e.g., Brian L.
Ferrell, Recent Developments, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and the
Use of Market Forces to Control Sulfur Dioxide Emissions, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 235, 244 (1991).
101. See, e.g., Ferrell, supra note 100, at 244; New Strategies, supra.note

100, at 470.
102.

New Strategies,supra note 100, at 471.
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in the first decade, has turned out to be far lower than
originally anticipated. Although this difference has been
attributed primarily to fuel switching rather than technological
innovation at the outset, it is nevertheless clear that, had
feasibility been considered in setting the cap, higher emission
levels likely would have been permitted under the system. The
CAA's Title IV program contrasts with the EPA's proposed
Open Market Trading Program, 10 3 which would not impose a
cap on total emissions but would rely on permit-by-permit
allocations instead. Due to the absence of a cap, the Open
Market Trading Program has drawn criticism for its inability to
1 04
promote incentives for effective trading.
CONCLUSION
Eco-pragmatism rests on the premise that the social
sustainability of environmental law requires the integration of
environmental and economic factors. While this premise is
axiomatic, the timing of the integration process may have
consequences and merits consideration.
Environmental
pragmatism should not necessarily be wedded to the notion of
starting from a "deliberate middle," but should recognize that it
may be equally pragmatic to start from a clear rule and adjust,
recognizing the feedback loops inherent in the political process,
and the various incentive structures operating on regulated
entities, outside interest groups, and regulators themselves.
Although excessive rigidity is not a good idea, there is a
logic to preserving clear rules. Knowing that one element of
pragmatism is action/reaction in the field, and that
environmental standards are often the opening maneuvers in a
longer negotiation process, we may need to embrace clearer
positions at the beginning of the dance. Moreover, certain
nondiscretionary statutory commands or procedures, which
initially might appear unforgiving and thus unsustainable
under the eco-pragmatic
framework, may serve as
preconditions for developing new kinds of pragmatic, market
103. Open Market Trading Rule for Ozone Smog Precursors, 60 Fed. Reg.
39, 668, 39, 670 (Aug. 3, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
104. The EPA's Office of Inspector General released a recent evaluation of
the program titled "Open Market Trading Program for Air Emissions Needs
Strengthening." EPA Report No. 2002-P-00019, at http://www.epa.gov/
oigearth/ereading-roomomt.pdf (Sept. 30, 2002). Environmental groups have
opposed the EPA proposals to approve open-market programs in various
states.
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and contract-based arrangements. Although starting from a
deliberate middle may in some cases be the best course, Ecopragmatism sets the stage for future discussions of the various
incentive systems operating on key players.
I look to Farber's more recent writings to uncover hints of a
reconciliation between Eco-pragmatism and the political
process. Farber's writings on slippage, which characterize
statutes as "the opening gambits in a prolonged bargaining
process," 10 5 may stimulate re-thinking of the relationship
between baseline commands and sustainable environmental
regulation.

105.

Farber, supra note 5, at 317.

